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An Empirical study of Covered Interest Arbitraqe:
Marqins Durinq the European Monetary system Crisis of 1992.

Research Honors
May 18, 1994

Ossi Saarinen

•
I. Introduction

Interest parity in international financial markets exists
when the interest rate differential between two counties is
exactly offset by the forward exchange premium/discount. If at
any moment the interest parity condition is not satisfied,
traders can execute covered interest arbitrage. Covered interest
arbitrage entails a series of four transactions in the currency
and securities markets which results in a practically riskless
profit. Although traditional economic theory predicts that the
opportunities will be wiped out as individuals take advantage of
the situation, covered interest. arbitrage margins (ClAMs) have
been observed to exist over extended periods of time.
Previous research in the area has attempted to rectify the
discrepancy by;identifying factors outside the basic arbitrage
equation which work to negate profit opportunities. The most
dominant of such factors in the literature have been transactions
costs, partly because they are quantifiable. Other factors, such
as political/financial-center risk, timing problems, and
imperfect elasticities of demand and supply have been explored as
well, but are more difficult to pin down empirically.
My research is an attempt to determine whether transactions
costs are enough to explain away ClAMs, or if
political/financial-center risk also plays an important role.
The focus is on the time period summer/fall 1992 when the
European Monetary System crisis occurred, bringing along with it
heavy speculation, volatility, and intervention in the currency
1
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markets. A higher political/financial-center risk for London is
hypothesized to exist during this time period, creating the
possibility of margins that cannot be explained away by simple
transactions costs alone, and thus presenting an ideal time for
further study.
Overall, the results of the research suggest that
transactions costs may indeed be enough to explain away margins
between developed financial centers such as London and New York,
but are inconclusive until better data is obtained.

II. Basic Theory

If interest parity does not hold, covered interest arbitrage
margins appear and riskless arbitrage is possible. For example,
if a negative margin is found to exist between New York and
London, a trader may execute the following set of transactions
for a profit:
1) borrow dollars on the u.s. market at a lower rate of
interest,
2) exchange dollars for British pounds on the spot market,
3) purchase higher yield British securities, and
4) enter a forward contract of corresponding maturity to bUy
back dollars.
This series of transactions is in itself riskless in that the
exchange rate exposure has been nUllified, thus guaranteeing a
profit at maturity regardless of changes in exchange rates.
Simple supply and demand reasoning leads us to believe that
the profit opportunity should be short-lived. As traders engage
in the transactions, pressure is applied on each component in
such a way that the interest differential and forward
2
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premium/discount produce parity. For example, the purchase of
pounds and sale of dollars on the spot market causes the dollar
exchange rate to weaken. It will consequently cost individuals
more to purchase pounds, adding to costs and reducing profit.
Similarly, an increased flow of funds to London and the
subsequent purchase of securities causes the interest rate on
these securities to fall, also decreasing the amount of profit
generated by arbitrage. The same reasoning applies for the u.S.
interest rates as well as the forward exchange rate. These sorts
of changes continue until interest parity is brought about and
investors are indifferent to covered interest arbitrage.
What this then suggests is that if people do act rationally
i.e. by taking advantage of profit opportunities, ClAMs should
not be observed. It is an established fact, however, that margins
exist in real life. For example, Grubel calculated margins for
the time period of 1956 to 1960 and found them to deviate from
parity at a range between negative two and five percent
annualized (pg. 80). More recent sources such as Salvatore (pg.
397) and Rivera-Batiz (pg. 109) also attest to the fact that
ClAMs exist.

III. Accounting for Observed Margins
A. Market Inefficiency

Early research in the area sought to fjndexplanations for
the ClAMs in the markets themselves. It was reasoned that the
markets were not sUfficiently efficient so as to act in a way
3
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that could eliminate ClAMs. This was in the time of the gold
standard and fixed exchange rates. Although these may have been
valid factors forty years ago in relatively under-developed
markets, today's financial markets are vastly different. Global
communications and computerized trading ensure almost
instantaneous access to the markets. Similarly, the international
flow of capital has been deregulated to such an extent that short
term funds are free to move between major financial centers
without obstacles. Thus, the roots of the persistence of ClAMs
are unlikely to be found in inefficient markets and obstacles to
transacting. 1
There exist two other major views or explanations of ClAMs,
each of which will be considered separately in this section. One
of them has been extensively explored by Frenkel and Levich, the
other by Grubel. I do not wish to suggest that either explanation
"belongs" or is solely represented by these people. Rather, f6r
the sake of simplicity and convenience, the theory of
transactions costs will be mainly associated with Frenkel and
Levich while that of additional risks with Grubel.

B. Transactions costs and the Neutral Band

Frenkel and Levich did not invent the concept of

1 The subsequent use of the concept of efficiency in this
paper is more generalized than the strict definition found in
economics/finance. By claiming that markets are efficient it is
simply meant that when faced with possible profit opportunities,
people act rationally.
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transactions costs as they were already considered in the
original piece on covered interest arbitrage, Keynes' A Tract on
Monetary Reform, but the majority of modern literature dealing
with transactions costs has been written by Frenkel and Levich.
The concept of transactions costs stems from the fact that
external costs not explicit in the covered interest arbitrage
formula itself exist. These costs include such things as
brokerage fees, time costs, subscription costs, and the costs of
being informed. If in sum these expenses are greater than the
possible profit derived from interest arbitrage, no rational
investor will execute the arbitrage. Thus, small margins could
exist for extended periods of time as almost an illusion--exact
interest parity does not hold, but in effect interest arbitrage
is not profitable.
The interest parity line can be seen in graphical form in
Figure 1 (see end of paper for all Figures). Any point not lying
on this 45 degree line does not satisfy the parity condition,
i.e. the interest differential is not exactly offset by the
discount/premium on foreign exchange. The existence of
transactions costs can be seen to create a neutral band around
the interest parity line (Figure 2). Any point contained within
this band would not represent a profit opportunity as the costs
of transacting would outweigh the potential returns. Such points
are considered to attest to the existence of functional interest
parity, whereas if points exist outside the neutral band, the
interest parity condition is not satisfied. Keynes believed that
5
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the yield advantage had to be in excess of 0.5% annualized to
induce any flows. Subsequent empirical estimates have placed the
number between 0.18% (Branson 1968) and 0.25% (Holmes and
Schott).
In functional notation, we can define the neutral band as:

where

id~= domestic interest rate
i fer = foreign interest rate
sp= spot exchange rate
fw= f~rward exchange rate
t~ and t sp= transactions costs in currency markets
td~ and t fer = transactions costs in securities markets.

This inequality basically states that for interest parity to hold
in effect, the sum of the transactions costs in currencies and
securities markets must be greater than or equal to the profit
margin derivable from interest arbitrage.

c. outside Risks
Grubel's work takes a distinctly different approach to
solving the dilemma. Modern Portfolio theory, as developed by
Tobin, forms the backbone of his explanation for why ClAMs exist.
The basic premise is that the demand for any security is a
function of the expected return and risk associated with holding
it. Initially, if there is a slight earnings advantage in favor
of a foreign security the flow of funds will be quick to exploit
it. However, it takes a higher and higher expected return to
induce more funds because of the risk associated with holding too

•

much of one asset. Thus, the supply of arbitrage funds is not
perfectly elastic (Grubel 15-18).
In times of relative calm in international markets, this
imperfection is assumed not to cause ClAMs. But, during times of
heavy speculation and volatility, interest parity may be
disrupted. Activity in the forward exchange markets is the chief
source of the disruption. As evidence for his view Grubel cites
the Suez Canal crisis of 1957 when heavy speculation against the
pound existed, and ClAMs were observed to exist for a long
period.
A non-technical explication of the outside risks associated
with covered interest arbitrage may help shed some more light on
the matter. Covered interest arbitrage is riskless only in the
sense that exchange rate risk has been nUllified, not in the
sense that there are absolutely no other risks involved with it.
Two basic considerations are behind the portfolio approach.
First, the fact that funds are tied up for a definite amount of
time adds risk to covered interest arbitrage that is not inherent
in the transactions themselves. Anytime funds are tied up, a
certain amount of risk is added--for example, opportunities with
higher returns could arise, or the money might be needed
elsewhere. Second, the higher the proportion of portfolio
investments held in any single asset is, the less diversification
there is, and clearly this is also a risk consideration. These
two outside risks exist regardless of the time period under
consideration. They are almost impossible to quantify, and thus
7
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cannot be explored in the empirical section explicitly. There
exists a third type of outside risk, however, that presents an
opportunity for empirical investigation.
The third outside risk, which is explored by Frenkel and
Levich in their empirical studies and hinted at by Grubel as
well, is that of political/financial-center risk. International
investments always carry with them an additional risk
consideration which stems from the fact that foreign governments
are sovereign (Rivera-Batiz pg. 115). In other words, a u.s.
investor has no guarantee that his funds are safe when invested
abroad. Each financial center carries with it a perceived amount
of risk which investors must be compensated for in terms of
higher returns if they are to invest there. Obviously, the
political and financial stability of the United states allows it
to offer much lower rates than say Hungary as far as foreign
investors are concerned.
The difference in stable times between London and New York
may be minimal, but in volatile times this is not necessarily so.
If either were to experience instability, it would consequently
be associated with a higher political/financial-center risk. Thus
in this sense covered interest arbitrage is not entirely risk
free either. There clearly exist outside risks--capital controls,
financial system collapse, repatriation problems etc.--that
become more likely in times of turbulence.
ThUS, what we gather from this discussion is that it is
possible that outside risks can keep investors from taking
8
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advantage of covered interest arbitrage and cause margins to
persist, especially in volatile and turbulent times.

IV. Description of Time Period

In this study I wish to examine the role these two
explanations (transactions cost and outside risk) played in
determining interest parity during the time of the European
Monetary crisis of 1992. The summer and fall of 1992 were
characterized by a tremendous amount of turbulence in Europe that
derived from both economic and political spheres.
German interest rates were,kept high by the Bundesbank in an
effort to keep inflationary pressures resulting from re
unification in check2 • The other members of the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) were struggling with their own economic
recoveries and thus would have wished to lower interest rates as
a stimulus. Yet the ERM required that exchange rates of member
countries fluctuate within a narrow band, and lower interest
rates compared to Germany would have caused this band to be
broken by many currencies. Simultaneously, there existed
political friction over the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty. All these factors resulted in volatility, speculation,
and turbulence. The pressure on the British pound finally proved
too great to quell. Despite heavy intervention on its behalf, the
pound was set to float as Britain disjoined, the ERM indefinitely

2
The events of 1992 are from Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, November 1992.
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on September 16, 1992.
Since during this same period the united States enjoyed a
period of calm, London is assumed to have a higher
political/financial-center risk associated with it. Tying
together our previous discourse, we reach the following synopsis.
If political/financial-center risk does in fact lead to larger
and more persistent ClAMs, this should definitely be evident
during our period of study because of its volatile nature. Yet if
transactions costs do an adequate job of accounting for the
margins between New York and London even in summer/fall of 1992,
they probably constitute a satisfactory explanation in normal
times as well.

v.

Data

The calculation of covered interest arbitrage margins and
transactions costs require data on domestic and foreign interest
rates, spot and forward exchange rates, and bid and ask prices on
securities. The table on the following page indicates exactly how
each variable is defined.

10
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-Interest Rates- Traditional Pair of Securities:
id~
u.s. 90-day Treasury-Bill rate.
it:or
U.K. 90-day Treasury-Bill rate.
-Interest Rates- Non-Traditional Pair of Securities:
id~
90-day Eurodollar deposit rate in London.
i~r
U.K. 90-day Treasury-Bill rate.
-Foreign Exchange Rates:
spot price of
sp
fw
Forward price
spot price of
US/OM
spot price of
OM/UK
spot price of
US/UK

pounds per dollar.
of pounds per dollar.
dollars in terms of marks.
marks in terms of pounds.
dollars in terms of pounds.

-Bid-Ask Prices:
Price a dealer paid for a U.S. or U.K. 90-day
Bid
Treasury-Bill at purchase.
Price the investor must pay to the dealer for
Ask
the U.S. or U.K. 90-day Treasury-Bill.
All data are weekly, from April 3 to December 24, 1992. The
interest rates are Friday closing figures, collected from The
Bank of Englanq Quarterly Bulletin; the rest are collected from
the Friday editions of The Wall Street Journal.

VI. Method of study
A. The Point of using Two Sets of Securities

The method by which we will accomplish a comparison of the
opposing explanations involves using two pairs of securities,
defined in section V as a traditional and non-traditional pair.
Frenkel and Levich along with many other researchers have used
this technique in their studies.
A test for interest parity requires that the securities used
to calculate ClAMs be as similar as possible. They should be of
the same maturity and risk class to produce a completely valid

11
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test. As the discussion on political/financial-center risk
revealed, however, using the traditional pair of simple

u.s. and

U.K. Treasury Bills introduces some error because of the

different risks associated with each. What we must do, then, is
to remove this risk from the calculation of ClAMs.
One way to accomplish this is to use a non-traditional
securities pair in addition to the traditional one just
mentioned. The non-traditional pair ideally consists of data
collected at an external financial center, such as Paris, on the

.

rates the two currencies command. Since such data was not
available for use in this study, we create a sUbstitute by basing
both securities in London instead of some external center. It is
hoped that this will serve the function of equalizing the
political/financial-center risk adequately.
comparing the ClAMs produced by the non-traditional as well
as the traditional pair should then reveal that margins are
smaller for non-traditional pair data. If transactions costs
explain away all the margins produced by non-traditional pair
data but only part of those associated with traditional pair
data, we have evidence that political/financial-center risk is
indeed an important consideration in establishing effective
interest parity. If it should turn out, though, that the
transactions costs are sufficient in encompassing all margins
regardless of which data is used, then we could conclude that
turbulence does not affect interest parity equilibrium much.

12
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B. calculating the ClAMs
The covered interest arbitrage margins are calculated using
the first part of equation (l). The simple margins obtained with
traditional pair data can be observed as an example from
Figure 3.

C. Estimating the Neutral Band
As transactions costs are impossible to quantify directly,
we must use a proxies for costs in the currency as well as
securities markets. Again, these proxies are generally accepted
and used in the literature concerning CIAMs, and thus will be
adopted directly.
The triangular arbitrage equation (2) provides an indirect
method for measuring transactions costs.

({US/DM)*{DM/UK»/{US/UK)=l

(2)

(for variable definitions, see section v.)
It should not be possible for the holder of dollars to purchase
pounds through German marks and end up with a different amount
than if they go directly from dollars to pounds. Thus, in the
absence of transactions costs, equation (2) must equal 1. When
the costs of transacting in these markets is figured in, there
will result a slight discrepancy in the condition. This
discrepancy is our proxy for transactions costs in currency
markets.
In using equation (2) to reveal transactions costs, we are
assuming that currency markets are efficient. It is very easy for
13
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banks and traders to take advantage of any earnings potential
derived from triangular arbitrage without even tying up funds.
Thus, it is well within reason for the sake of the proxy to
assume efficiency in nUllifying such opportunities.
It is important that the data collected be as simultaneously
recorded as possible. Exchange rates are in a continuous state of
flux due to 24 hour trading, and clearly observations collected
at different points in time cause unnecessary noise to be
introduced.
Since it was not possible to find all three cross rates
required to compute equation (2)' in the forward exchange markets,
it is assumed that transactions costs in forward markets are
equal to those of the spot markets. In other words, in terms of
equation (1), tf,,=t. p •
To find a proxy for transactions costs in securities
markets, the following is used:
(Ask Price-Bid Price)/(Ask Price)

(3)

Dealers of securities require compensation, the difference
between the bid and ask price, for their services and liquidity.
Following the work of Demsetz (1968), Frenkel and Levich multiply
the reSUlting figure by 2.5 to estimate total costs in securities
markets. In this way the proxy is then extended to account for
brokerage fees as well as the reward dealers command. The method
will thus be used for our purposes as well •.
Again, the spreads were not readily available for British
securities, so we assume tdOlll=tror.
14
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Figure 4 displays, among other things, the plot of a five
week moving average of computed transactions costs. The moving
average was utilized to smooth out excessive volatility from the
measurement. Figure 5, on the other hand, shows the average
transactions cost from over the entire period of study plotted as
a neutral band around interest parity. Our average estimate of
the transactions costs lands around 0.10%, which is a reasonable
figure when compared to the findings of Branson, Holmes, and
Schott.

VIII. Results
The overall results of computing ClAMs and transactions
costs are seen in full in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
From FigUre 4, the most immediately striking observation is
that the margins generated by the non-traditional pair are
without exception greater than the traditional pair margins. This
runs contrary to expectations--recall that by equalizing
political/financial-center risk it was expected that there exist
less discrepancy between the interest rates and between London
and New York. Thus, the margins were also expected to be smaller.
What this leads us to believe, then, is that our non
traditional pair data is not an adequate substitute for the ideal
type mentioned earlier. It was hoped that basing both securities
in London would do the job. However, the London T-Bill and
Eurodollar deposits may not be completely comparable. There must
exist some fundamental difference between these two types of
15
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interest rates that render them inadequate for the purpose of our
study. If Eurodollar data in Paris for both currencies had been
found, they would have most likely produced margins smaller than
those of the traditional pair.
The margins created by the traditional pair data are almost
completely bound by transactions costs, i.e. the neutral band.
This observation is made clear by looking at Figure 5. Here, the
average total transactions costs through the entire time period
is found and then plotted around interest parity, producing a
neutral band. This neutral band contains within it all except one
traditional pair ClAM. Recall that any point within the neutral
band is not a profit opportunity as costs outweigh benefits.
The only point in our sample time period that did not fall
within the neutral band occurred on September 18, very close to
the time Britain let its currency float. There are two possible
ways of interpreting this outline. First, it could be that a real
ClAM, and thus an unexploited profit opportunity, existed at this
time. In fact, a profit opportunity could have persisted for
nearly two weeks around September 18 and we would not know about
it because of the sparsity of observations. Thus it could be that
the volatility surrounding Britain's exit from the ERM did really
cause margins, giving support for Grubel's theory.
However, the September 18 point could merely reflect timing
problems in the data. The exchange rates moved quickly during
this period and the different measures that go into calculating
ClAMs are not collected at exactly the same point in time. Thus,
16
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additional noise created by the moves could be causing an
inflated margin. The margin observed could then be just a result
of measurement imperfections. Until more condensed (for example
daily) data are found and tested to reduce the timing problem, it
cannot be claimed with certainty that transactions costs negated
all profit opportunities for the period of stUdy.

IX. Conclusions
The major weakness of this study was the quality of data and
the lack of true external center data. If we had obtained say
daily observations, it would have been much easier to make a
clear judgement on what the case of September 18 really
represents. Also, real external center data for the non
traditional pair would have aided in exploring
political/financial-center risk with more clarity.
still, the results discussed above were successful in
showing that for most of the time, transactions costs are
sufficient in explaining away margins. Regardless of the one
anomaly, the results do tend to lead us toward concluding that
interest parity is maintained between London and New York largely
by transactions costs alone, and that political/financial-center
risk considerations are of secondary importance. This is not to
say that the theory presented by Grubel is not applicable and
should be abandoned, but that transactions costs clearly proved
to be the dominant force in establishing effective interest
parity in our study.
17
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The fact that transactions costs appeared to do the job
alone probably stems from the fact that both of the financial
centers in question are known for their overall stability. Even
though London was experiencing major turbulence, Britain is still
an economically strong and politically stable investment site.
Thus investors are less likely to respond negatively to adverse
news because they have assurances of safety based on the
historical track record of London.
Thus it could be that the political/financial-center risk
consideration is of much greater importance when considering
other financial centers. Were we to consider covered interest
arbitrage between centers like New York and Kuala Lumpur or
London and Prague, political/financial-center risk might assert
itself as being of major importance in establishing interest
parity because of the differential in risk class between the
centers in question. This possibility presents an interesting'
area, for further research.
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